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Abstract
We provide a methodology to estimate a global credit risk factor from CDS spreads that can be 
very useful for risk management. The global risk factor (GRF) reproduces quite well the different epis-
odes that have affected the credit market over the sample period. It is highly correlated with standard 
credit indices, but it contains much higher explanatory power for fluctuations in CDS spreads across 
sectors than the credit indices themselves. The additional information content over iTraxx seems to 
be related to some financial interest r ates. We first use the estimated GRF to  analyze the extent to 
which the eleven sectors we consider are systemic. After that, we use it to split the credit risk of indi-
vidual issuers into systemic, sectorial, and idiosyncratic components, and we perform some analyses 
to test that the estimated idiosyncratic components are actually firm-specific. The systemic and sec-
torial components explain around 65% of credit risk in the European industrial and financial firms 
and 50% in the North American firms in those sectors, while 35% and 50% of risk, respectively, has an 
idiosyncratic nature. Thus, there is a significant margin for portfolio diversification. We also show 
that our decomposition allows us to identify those firms whose credit would be harder to hedge. We 
end up analyzing the relationship between the estimated components of risk and some synthetic risk 
factors, in order to learn about the different nature of the credit risk components.
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SPLITTING CREDIT RISK INTO SYSTEMIC, SECTORIAL AND IDIOSYNCRATIC COMPONENTS
ABSTRACT. We provide a methodology to estimate a global credit risk factor from CDS spreads that can be 
very useful for risk management. The global risk factor (GRF) reproduces quite well the different episodes 
that have affected the credit market over the sample period. It is highly correlated with standard credit in-
dices, but it contains much higher explanatory power for fluctuations in CDS spreads across sectors than 
the credit indices themselves. The additional information content over iTraxx seems to be related to some 
financial interest rates. We first use the estimated GRF to analyze the extent to which the eleven sectors we 
consider are systemic. After that, we use it to split the credit risk of individual firms into systemic, sectorial, 
and idiosyncratic components, and we perform some analyses to test that the estimated idiosyncratic com-
ponents are actually firm-specific. The systemic and sectorial components explain around 65% of  credit 
risk in the European industrial and financial sectors and 50% in the North American sectors, while 35%
and 50% of risk, respectively, has an idiosyncratic nature. Thus, there is a significant margin for portfolio 
diversification. We also show that our decomposition allows us to identify those firms whose credit would 
be harder to hedge. We end up analyzing the relationship between the estimated components of risk and 
some synthetic risk factors, in order to learn about the different nature of the credit risk components.
JEL classification: C58, F34, G01, G32
Keywords: Credit Risk, Systemic Risk, Sectorial Risk, Idiosyncratic Risk, Asset Allocation
1. INTRODUCTION
The financial crisis has shown the importance of determining the main influences and character-
istics of sovereign and corporate credit markets. This has become a requirement for financial insti-
tutions, since the Basel III agreement emphasizes that the credit strategy of a financial institution
must take into account the cyclical aspects of the economy and the resulting shifts in the composition
and quality of the overall credit portfolio. The credit strategy should be viable in the long-run, through
various economic cycles and changing economic conditions, and financial institutions must know the
sensitivity of their credit portfolio to a wide variety of macroeconomic and financial indicators. Addi-
tionally, credit policies are required to ensure appropriate diversification at the portfolio level, and to
have the ability to identify any particular sensitivities or concentrations [see BCBS (2000)]. For that,
a central issue is to have an estimate of the interrelations among industry sectors and, in particular,
the degree to which credit risk in a given sector is of a systemic nature. Both issues: the sensitivity of
credit risk to changing economic and financial conditions, and the evaluation of the systemic nature
of sectorial credit risk, are examined in this paper.
Financial support by grants ECO2015-67305-P, PrometeoII/2013/015, Programa de Ayudas a la Investigación from Banco de Es-
paña is gratefully acknowledged.This article is an enlarged version of Chapter 3 in A. Chamizo’s doctoral disssertation, available
at https://eprints.ucm.es/40767/1/T38233.pdf. It reflects the opinions of the authors, but not the opinion of BBVA..
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The key lesson learned from this crisis is that financial institutions need to have a comprehensive
risk appetite framework in place that helps them to better understand and manage their risks by trans-
lating risk metrics and methods into strategic decisions, reporting, and day-to-day business decisions
[FBS (2013) and EBA (2014)]. Our analysis provides an element for such a risk appetite framework.
By providing an estimate of the global risk factor, analyzing its determinants and using that factor to
evaluate the systemic and the idiosyncratic components of risk, we describe an empirical framework
that can be used by financial institutions to manage their risk. Indeed, by evaluating sectors with the
most potential to produce systemic risk problems, our analysis should also be considered to be crucial
for supervisors and regulators.
A crucial issue for asset allocation in the credit markets is the diversification of a credit portfolio.
Indeed, the sensitivity of each sector to the global risk factor will suggest to what extent the risk in a
sectorial credit portfolio is systemic or idiosyncratic in nature. Especially important would be its ap-
plication to the financial sector, to identify the systemic financial institutions. Besides, the sensitivity
of credit risk from a particular sector or a geographic region to the global risk factor should help to take
positions in anticipation of events affecting global risk and, in particular, to design an efficient hedge
of a credit portfolio.
A sensible global credit risk factor could also be very useful when trying to anticipate the occurrence
of a stress period in credit markets. Precisely, our analysis is a good starting point to evaluate credit risk
exposures under stressful conditions, another requirement from Basel III. Stress testing should involve
identifying possible events or future changes in economic conditions that could have unfavorable
effects on a bank’s credit exposures and also assessing the bank’s ability to withstand such changes.
Three areas that banks could usefully examine are (i) economic or industry downturns; (ii) market-risk
events; and (iii) liquidity conditions. The banks should attempt to identify the type of situations, such
as economic downturns, both in the whole economy and in particular sectors, and the combinations
of credit and market events, which could produce substantial losses. Besides evaluating the relevance
of the systemic component of sectorial credit portfolios, and for estimating the sensitivity of sectorial
indices to macroeconomic and financial indicators, we also use the global risk factor for stress testing
global and sectorial credit portfolios.
We propose a simple methodology to estimate a global risk factor in credit markets from CDS
spreads, as well as to advance in the characterization of its determinants. The most widely used meas-
ures of systemic risk are based on information on CDS spreads, which are forward-looking and reflect
the market perception of the credit risk of the firm. We first construct sectorial credit indices from
daily CDS spread data for individual firms in that sector. So, we pool together CDS data from firms in
the same sector from different regions. This is a reasonable approach, since there is more similarity
among CDS spreads from the same sector in different regions than among CDS spreads of different
sectors in the same region. Then, we use a principal component analysis across sectorial indices to
construct the global risk factor. The observed high commonality among sectorial indices suggests that
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our proposed characterizations of a global risk factor is sensible. Our estimates are robust to alternat-
ive strategies for the estimation of sectorial credit indices. We show that well diversified CDS portfolios
from a given sector have good possibilities for hedging by taking a contrary position in iTraxx or CDX
indices or in their derivative products.
We use our global risk factor to decompose credit risk at the level of the firm into systemic, sectorial
and idiosyncratic components. This decomposition of risk for the industrial and financial sectors
points to relatively large idiosyncratic components of risk that are still larger in North American than in
European firms, which may be due to a lack of liquidity. We provide evidence suggesting that portfolios
made up of firms with higher idiosyncratic components are easier to hedge, contrary to what happens
with portfolios made up of firms with lower idiosyncratic risk components. That is observed uniformly
over the industrial and financial sectors of Europe and North America. Finally, we explore the nature
of each estimated risk component by analyzing its sensitivity to some synthetic risk factors.
Our analysis provides an element for a risk appetite framework at financial institutions, since they
could easily use the numerical estimates of risk components we propose to maintain their risk limits
when taking their asset allocation decisions. Furthermore, by evaluating the firms and sectors with
the most potential to produce systemic risk problems, our analysis should also be considered to be
crucial for supervisors and regulators.
The paper is structured as follows: In the next section, we review the most relevant literature on
this topic. In Section 3 we describe our database for CDS spreads as well as for the financial and mac-
roeconomic indicators that are used throughout the paper. In Section 4 we construct sectorial credit
indices for all the sectors and examine their time evolution. We also estimate a global risk factor, and
analyze its main characteristics. In Section 5 we decompose credit risk into systemic and idiosyncratic
components at the level of the sectors. In Section 6 we decompose credit risk into systemic, sectorial
and idiosyncratic components at the level of the firm for the industrial and financial sectors of Europe
and North America and we examine the nature of each estimated risk component by analyzing their
relationship with some synthetic risk factors. Finally, we conclude with a summary of the main find-
ings.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Given the importance of the topic for researchers and market regulators after the financial crisis,
the recent literature on measuring systemic risk has been quite extensive, and in this section we briefly
review the papers we consider most relevant for our work.
A first strand of literature has considered the characterization of an indicator of systemic risk, with
the principal component methodology playing a prominent role in that search. Using a sample of 150
European firms from January 2003 to July 2007, Berndt and Obreja (2010) show that the first principal
component of CDS returns explained 46% of the variation in weekly CDS returns, even after correcting
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for a market factor (weekly excess return on the MSCI Europe index) and a term premium, computed
as the spread between the weekly return on the ten-year Euribor bond and the one-week Euribor.
Chen and Härdle (2015) found that the first principal component for a set of eight iTraxx and CDX
indices of 5- and 10-year maturities and investment grade and high-yield ratings explained 58.7% of
the variance in the pre-crisis period, increasing up to 72.3% of the variance in the crisis period, but
only 47% in the post-crisis period. They also concluded that a four-factor model could provide a good
fit to weekly changes in CDS indices, with all factors receiving a significant market price. Bhansali
et al. (2008) also use a three-jump model, and a different dataset from ours to carry out a decom-
position of CDS spreads among systemic risk, sectorial risk and idiosyncratic risk. Duellmann and
Masschelein (2007) used the analytic version of the analytic value-at-risk approximation developed
by Pykhtin (2004) which only requires risk parameters on a sector level. This approach is applied to
measure the impact of credit concentrations in business sectors on the economic capital of credit
portfolios. The sector composition of the portfolios is based on credit information from the German
central credit register.
Most of the literature on this type of decomposition has focused on the financial sector, at firm level.
Rodríguez-Moreno and Peña (2013) analyzed two groups of systemic risk measures when searching
for the best systemic indicator over the January 2004-November 2009 sample period. A first group
contained indicators related to the overall tension in the market, while a second group was made up
by indicators related to the contributions of individual institutions to systemic risk. In a sample of
20 European banks and 13 US banks they found that the first principal component of CDS spreads
performed better as a systemic indicator than measures of market stress. Using daily data from 15
financial institutions from Europe and the US from January 2004 to June 2010, Giglio (2010) showed
that the upturn in bond yields and CDS spreads of financial institutions during the crisis reflected
increases in idiosyncratic default risk rather than systemic risk. This was the case for the months be-
fore the Bear Stearns episode in March 15, 2008, and also after Lehman’s default. Hammoudeh et al.
(2013) examined the behavior of the US 5-year sector CDS spread indices for banking, the financial
services and the insurance sector over the period January 2004 to March 2009, suggesting the exist-
ence of an important systemic component of credit risk in the three sectors. Puzanova and Düllmann
(2013) present an approach for measuring systemic risk and decomposing it into the contributions
of individual institutions. To assess the system-wide loss, they modeled a banking sector as a port-
folio comprising banks’ net of capital liabilities, using a widely used credit risk model to assess the
tail risk of such a portfolio. The model inputs were the banks’ individual probabilities of default, the
size of their net of capital liabilities and the banks’ sensitivity to systemic factors, which capture cor-
relations between banks’ asset returns. Eder and Keiler (2015) estimated the degree of systemic risk
and the magnitude of risk spillover effects by introducing a specific weighting scheme in a regres-
sion that relates observations to each other. They measure contagion effects in CDS levels as well as
CDS changes. Their methodology allows for a decomposition of the total risk charge into a systemic,
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systemic and idiosyncratic risk charge. They found considerable spillovers of risk due to the intercon-
nectedness of the systemically important banks and insurance companies in their sample. Depending
on the state of the economy, up to a fifth of the total predicted CDS spread changes were due to fin-
ancial infection, highlighting the need for macro-prudential supervision and serving as an alternative
explanation for the nonlinear relationship between a debtor’s theoretical probability of default and
observed credit spreads. The decomposition of risk into its systemic and idiosyncratic components
has also been extensively studied for sovereign CDS markets, but we do not review it here. (Heitfield
et al., 2006) examine the influence of systematic and idiosyncratic risk on credit losses for portfolios of
large wholesale bank loans. They concluded that the relative importance of expected loss, systematic
risk, and idiosyncratic risk varies considerably from sector-to-sector and is sensitive to the distribution
of exposures within a given portfolio.
Other important contributions to the literature have examined the relevance of systemic risk in
sovereign credit, using CDS spreads. Hilscher and Nosbusch (2010) studied the relative importance of
country-specific and global factors on sovereign debt prices for a set of 31 emerging market countries
from 1994 to 2007, to find that country-specific fundamentals have substantial explanatory power,
even after controlling for global factors. Longstaff et al. (2011) found that sovereign credit risk tends to
be much more correlated across countries than are equity index returns for the same countries. Their
outcome suggested that the source of these higher correlations is the dependence of sovereign credit
spreads on a common set of global market factors, risk premiums, and liquidity patterns. Badaoui
et al. (2013) applied a factor model to decompose sovereign credit default swaps (CDS) spreads into
default, liquidity, systemic liquidity and correlation components. Their analysis shows that sovereign
CDS spreads were highly driven by liquidity, while sovereign bond spreads are less subject to liquidity
frictions and therefore could represent a better proxy for sovereign default risk. Finally, their empirical
results suggested that the increase in the CDS spreads observed during the crisis period was mainly
due to a surge in liquidity rather than to an increase in the default intensity. Heinz and Sun (2014)
found that European countries’ sovereign CDS spreads are largely driven by global investor sentiment,
macroeconomic fundamentals and liquidity conditions, even though the relative importance of these
factors changed over time.
In terms of the determinants of risk, Berndt and Obreja (2010) and Chen and Härdle (2015) try to
characterize the most influential financial variables that explain credit spread movements by analyz-
ing the impact of some financial variables on individual CDS spreads and CDS indices, respectively.
Much of this literature has focused on individual firm data, using accounting data and firm’s charac-
teristics as indicators of credit risk. Often, the goal has been to explain default rates. Our objective
is somewhat different, as we use a wide set of macroeconomic and financial variables to explain the
time evolution of corporate sector CDS indices according to the Industry Classification Benchmark.
Schwaab et al. (2017) studied the dynamic properties of systemic default risk conditions for firms in
different countries, industries and rating groups. They found that macro and default-specific world
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factors are a primary source of default clustering across countries. Defaults cluster more than what
shared exposures to macro factors imply, indicating that other factors also play a significant role. For
all firms, deviations of systemic default risk from macro fundamentals were correlated with net tight-
ening bank lending standards, suggesting that bank credit supply and systemic default risk were in-
versely related.
3. THE DATA
We have used the database provided by Markit, the main supplier of CDS prices [Markit (2008) and
Markit (2012)]. We selected the fields: ticker, tier, spread, sector and region. The ’Ticker’ field gives
information on the key name of the firm. ’Tier’ contains the type of debt to be delivered in the event of
a default. This might be either SEDCOM Secured Debt (Corporate/Financial), SNRFOR Senior Unse-
cured Debt (Corporate/Financial), SOVEREIGN Debt (Government), SUBLT2 Subordinated or Lower
Tier 2 Debt (Banks), JRSUBUT2 Junior Subordinated or Upper Tier 2 Debt (Banks), and PREFT1 Pref-
erence Shares, or Tier 1 Capital (Banks). Markit provides information on CDS spreads with different
tenors: 6M, 1Y, 2Y, 3Y, 4Y, 5Y, 7Y, 10Y, 15Y, 20Y, and 30Y. The most liquid CDS is the 5-year contract.
All these prices are composite, which means that for a given restructuring event, firm and currency,
they are the average of prices provided by different financial institutions. The ’Sector’ field is based on
the ICB classification, (Industry Classification Benchmark), which distinguishes four levels: Industry,
Supra Sector, Sector, and Subsector. We work at Markit industry level, which considers 11 industries:
energy, basic materials, industrials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care, financials, tech-
nology, telecommunication services, utilities, and government.1 Finally, Markit considers 13 different
regions: Africa, Asia, Caribbean, Eastern Europe, Europe, India, Latin America, Middle East, North
America, Oceania, OffShore, Pacific and Supranational.
We consider the data on 5-year CDS trading of senior unsecured debt, SNRFOR, with 2,608 daily
observations between January 2006 and December 2015 on approximately 2,500 firms from the 11
mentioned industries and the 13 geographical areas. We select the 760 firms having daily quotes on
their 5-year CDS without having been subject to a merger or acquisition. Most of the CDSs have ratings
“BBB” or “A”. The best represented sectors are financials, consumer services and industrials, while the
main regions are North America, Europe, and Asia. These distributions are relatively stable over time.
To derive a fundamental interpretation of some of the estimates we compute throughout the paper,
we will use a wide set of daily indicators from the Bloomberg database. For the purpose of interpret-
ing our results, we classify them as pure financial indicators, equity indicators, risk aversion indicators
and indicators bearing some relationship with macroeconomic or monetary policy. Some of the rela-
tionships of credit spreads with financial market indicators may be short-lived, and they may be lost
if we aggregate to monthly frequencies. It will clearly be interesting to analyze the relationship with
1Government is a category considered by Markit but not included in the Industry Classification Benchmark.
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business cycle indicators, but our interest here is to evaluate what type of indicators have a stronger
influence on credit spreads.
Financial indicators: 1) one-year EURO Swap Rate, 2) five-year EURO Swap Rate, 3) ten-year EURO
Swap Rate, 4) one-year USD Swap Rate, 5) five-year USD Swap Rate, 6) ten-year USD Swap Rate, 7)
one-year JPY Swap rate, 8) five-year JPY Swap rate, 9) ten-year JPY Swap rate.
Equity Indicators (the 10 MSCI global equity indices) 10-19): MSCI World/Energy, MSCI World/Basic
materials, MSCI World/Consumer goods, MSCI World/Consumer services, MSCI World/Financials, ,
MSCI World/Industrials, MSCI World/Healthcare, MSCI World/Technology, MSCI World/Telecommunication
services and MSCI World/Utility.
Interest rates: 20) three-month USD LIBOR Interest Rate, 21) three-month EURIBOR interest rate,
22) three-month EONIA Index.
Risk aversion indicators: 23) Euro liquidity premium, measured by the absolute difference between
three-month EURIBOR and three-month EONIA, both in euros, 24) USD liquidity risk premium, meas-
ured by the absolute difference between three-month LIBOR and the three-month OIS Index, 25)
three-month five-year USD swaption, 26) three-month five-year Euro swaption, 27) the VIX Volatil-
ity Index, from CBOE, as market expectations of near-term volatility conveyed by S&P 500 stock index
option prices, 28) the VSTOXX Index, as implied volatility in EURO STOXX 50 real-time option prices,
29) implied volatility from option prices for the three-month euro-dollar exchange rate, 30) implied
volatility from the 3-month ATM iTraxx Europe Index options, 31) implied volatility from the 3-month
ATM CDX North American Investment Grade Index Option.2
Macroeconomic indicators: 32) euro-dollar exchange rate, 33) 5-year German government yield,
34) yield on 10-year German government bond, 35) 5-year US Treasury Rate, 36) yield on 10-year US
Treasury, 37) the 10-year yield on Japan government debt, 38-40) term structure slope, defined as the
10-year, 1-year rates spread, rt,10− rt,1, in swap rates in US dollar, euro, and yen, 41-43) term structure
curvature, defined as rt,10 − 2rt,5 + rt,1, from swap rates in US dollar, euro and yen.
4. EXAMINING THE HISTORIC DATA
4.1. Sectorial indices . We construct daily CDS indices for each sector by taking the median CDS
spread traded each day in that sector across all firms in all regions, as shown in Figure 4.1. Weekly
sectorial data are obtained by taking weekly averages of the daily observations for each sectorial credit
index. Finally, we compute logarithmic changes of weekly CDS spreads, obtaining a total of 365
weekly observations over the 2006-2016 period. This is the sectorial credit data we use in what fol-
lows. Their main statistical characteristics are displayed in Table 1. sectorial CDS indices are clearly
non-stationary, while their weekly changes are stationary, as it can be confirmed from the application
2The implicit volatilities from 3-month ATM iTraxx Europe Index Option and the 3-month ATM CDX North American Invest-
ment Grade Index Option were provided by JP Morgan.
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of Dickey-Fuller tests (rows 10-15 in Table 1). The higher volatility is achieved by weekly changes in
spreads from telecommunication services and the government sector. Interestingly enough, all sec-
tors display right skewness, while kurtosis is particularly high in the financial, government, health
care and utilities sectors. As a consequence, the assumption of normality as the distribution of weekly
changes in CDS spreads is overwhelmingly rejected in all sectors.
The time evolution of the sectorial indices shows the main market events that took place during the
sample period. New Century Financial, largest U.S. subprime lender, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy,
announcing the departure of more than half the workforce as of 2 April 2007, with no apparent impact
on CDS spreads. Even more surprisingly, CDS spreads barely increased at the time of the Bear Sterns
crisis in July 2007. However, the market was accumulating fears on the situation of credit. The origin of
the financial crisis may be placed on August 9, 2007, with BNP Paribas announcing that it was ceasing
activity in three hedge funds that specialized in US mortgage debt. The announcement acted as a
signal that there were tens of trillions of US dollar worth of derivatives which were worth much less
than previously estimated. Since nobody knew the exposure of individual banks to these toxic assets,
trust evaporated overnight and banks stopped doing business with each other. The perception of
risk spread over all sectors, which explains the simultaneous increase shown in Figure 4.1 Spreads
peaked in March 2008 at a median level of 150 bp. After a temporary reduction, spreads again started
a moderate increasing trend, well before the difficulties that would come later in the summer. The
Lehman Brothers bankruptcy brought them to a median level across sectors of 300 bp. by March
2009. The anticipation of an impending crisis in CDS spreads over 2008 has not been sufficiently
emphasized in the credit risk literature.
CDS spreads reached their highest values during the first quarter of 2009. Finally, the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, commonly referred to as the Stimulus or Recovery Act, was an
economic stimulus package enacted by the 111th United States Congress in February 2009 and signed
into law on 17 February 2009 by President Barack Obama. At the London G20 in April 2, 2009, world
leaders committed themselves to a $5tn (£3tn) fiscal expansion, an extra $1.1tn in resources to help
the International Monetary Fund and other global institutions boost jobs and growth, and to reform
the banks. During this period of government stimulus measures, spreads rapidly decreased, although
they stayed well above their pre-crisis levels.
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FIGURE 4.1. sectorial CDS spreads 2006-2015
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Note: sectorial CDS indices. Weekly data: January 2006-December 2015.
The S&P downgrade of US sovereign debt in August 5, 2011 again brought a sharp increase in CDS
spreads. In September, rating agencies downgraded the sovereign debt of some European countries,
and the U.S. Treasury Secretary urged European officials to deal with the crisis and avoid “catastrophic
risks” after flying to a meeting of European Union finance chiefs in Poland. The European debt crisis
produced another rise in CDS spreads. Only the decisive intervention of the ECB president in July 2012
could make CDS spreads finally start a slow reduction. At the end of 2015 the median across sectors
was 105 bp., versus the median of 40 bp. at the beginning of 2006.
Figure 4.1 shows that over the whole sample, sectorial indices show a good deal of low frequency
co-movement, with fluctuations of different sizes across sectors. Additionally, linear correlation coeffi-
cients among percent changes in CDS spreads in Table 2 show significant high-frequency co-movements
across all sectors. Median correlation coefficients for each sector [last row in the table] are around 0.70,
except for health care and technology, which have a median correlation in the neighborhood of 0.50
suggesting that they might be the less systemic sectors. The high overall correlations reflect the exist-
ence of at least a common factor, while the lower association between the health care and technology
sectors and all the others must be due to the existence of specific factors explaining fluctuations in
CDS prices in these two sectors. On the other hand, no single sector seems to be dominant, in the
sense of having higher correlations with all the other sectors.
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TABLE 1. Sectorial returns. Main statistics
BM CG CS EN FIN GOV HC IND TEC TEL UTI
Mean*100 0.171 0.106 0.135 0.303 0.304 0.282 0.087 0.150 -0.008 0.174 0.168
Standard deviation*100 4.15 3.82 3.92 4.29 4.57 5.42 3.96 4.02 4.09 5.13 3.46
Volatility 29.9% 27.5% 28.3% 30.9% 32.9% 39.1% 28.6% 29.0% 29.5% 37.0% 24.9%
Skewness 0.69 0.71 0.38 0.85 1.65 1.18 0.64 0.78 0.29 0.67 1.29
Kurtosis 5.43 6.88 4.96 6.73 11.84 9.28 9.52 6.36 3.86 5.31 8.91
Maximum 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.24 0.30 0.34 0.23 0.19 0.16 0.20 0.19
minimum -0.14 -0.16 -0.15 -0.18 -0.16 -0.22 -0.21 -0.15 -0.11 -0.19 -0.11
Range 0.34 0.35 0.33 0.42 0.46 0.56 0.43 0.34 0.28 0.39 0.31
Jarque-Bera 168.7 369.8 96.0 363.9 1933.4 978.0 958.2 297.0 23.5 154.0 902.7
Unit root tests
Index levels
adf1 -2.09 -1.97 -1.90 -1.91 -1.92 -2.06 -2.18 -1.83 -1.83 -2.38 -1.76
adf4 -2.28 -2.25 -2.20 -2.11 -2.16 -2.18 -2.37 -2.05 -1.87 -2.34 -2.09
adf8 -2.38 -2.08 -2.29 -2.69 -2.23 -2.54 -2.42 -2.40 -1.92 -2.82 -2.01
Weekly changes
adf1 -12.18 -13.57 -13.85 -12.35 -11.32 -13.86 -15.45 -12.88 -14.80 -14.50 -12.15
adf4 -8.65 -8.66 -8.88 -7.46 -8.74 -8.71 -8.23 -8.23 -9.18 -10.12 -8.36
adf8 -6.98 -6.98 -6.84 -5.76 -7.06 -6.52 -6.80 -6.45 -7.58 -6.95 -7.10
Note: Main statistics of weekly changes in sectorial indices. The Dickey-Fuller statistics for the sectorial indices in levels are shown in the upper
panel, while Dickey-Fuller for weekly changes of sectorial indices are shown in the lower panel.
BM = Basic materials, CG = Consumer goods, CS = Consumer services, EN = Energy, FIN = Financials, GOV = Government,
HC = Health care, IND = Industrials, TEC = Technology, TEL = Telecommunication services, and UTI = Utilities.
TABLE 2. sectorial correlation matrix
Sector BM CG CS EN FIN GOV HC IND TEC TEL UTI
BM 100% 73% 67% 67% 68% 61% 47% 76% 54% 62% 64%
CG 73% 100% 71% 69% 77% 65% 49% 80% 56% 67% 73%
CS 67% 71% 100% 65% 66% 57% 44% 71% 47% 66% 64%
EN 67% 69% 65% 100% 73% 62% 46% 70% 51% 64% 71%
FIN 68% 77% 66% 73% 100% 72% 49% 77% 53% 67% 76%
GOV 61% 65% 57% 62% 72% 100% 35% 67% 47% 56% 65%
HC 47% 49% 44% 46% 49% 35% 100% 52% 35% 42% 48%
IND 76% 80% 71% 70% 77% 67% 52% 100% 55% 67% 72%
TEC 54% 56% 47% 51% 53% 47% 35% 55% 100% 50% 51%
TEL 62% 67% 66% 64% 67% 56% 42% 67% 50% 100% 66%
UTI 64% 73% 64% 71% 76% 65% 48% 72% 51% 66% 100%
Median 67% 71% 66% 67% 72% 62% 47% 71% 51% 66% 66%
Note: Pairwise correlation matrix between weekly changes in sectorial indices. BM = Basic materials, CG = Consumer goods, CS = Consumer
services,
EN = Energy, FIN = Financials, GOV = Government, HC = Health care, IND = Industrials, TEC = Technology,
TEL = Telecommunication services, UTI = Utilities, and MCS = Median intra correlation for each sector.
4.2. Estimating a global risk factor. We characterize the commonality of risk across the different sec-
tors by applying a principal component methodology to weekly changes in the sectorial credit indices.
The first principal component explains 65% of the fluctuations in the weekly changes of the 11 sec-
torial indices, a confirmation that there is strong commonality among the sectors. The percentage of
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variance explained by the first principal component (65%) is higher than the one estimated by Berndt
and Obreja (2010) for European firms during the 2003 to 2008 period, but it is close to the average
explanatory power estimated by Chen and Härdle (2015) for the pre- (58.7%) and post-crisis periods
(72.3%).
Cumulative percentage of total variance explained by the first two principal components is 72%,
for the first three principal components it is 78%, and 83% for the first four. To explain a percentage
of variance of the order of 90% or 95% we would need a relatively large number of components. The
principal component loadings show that the first principal component is an approximate average of
CDS returns over all the sectors, although with a slightly weaker presence of the health care and tech-
nology sectors. The second component has the larger loadings in the government sector, while the
third component puts a heavier weight on health care and telecommunications, and the fourth prin-
cipal component is centered on technology. Precisely those sectors with a lower representation in the
first principal component, health care and technology, dominate the third and fourth principal com-
ponents, respectively, while the second component is dominated by the government sector.3 Principal
components after the first four are much harder to interpret. Hence, the principal components with
the higher explanatory power after the first one are essentially made up by sector-specific elements.
Since any estimate of a global risk factor should avoid embedding idiosyncratic elements, and these
are present in the successive principal components, we decide to stick to just the first principal com-
ponent as the estimate of a latent global credit risk factor, capturing two thirds of the variance in the
set of eleven sectorial credit indices.4 By construction, such a risk factor uses information on the set of
CDS spreads trading at each point in time for all firms in the different sectors in all regions.
The evolution of the explanatory power of the principal components throughout the sample gives
us an estimate of the way the degree of commonality has evolved over time. In so far as the effects of
the financial and economic crisis were felt over the whole economy, we should expect to see the com-
mon factors increasing relevance in that period of time, dominating sector-specific risk elements. To
check that hypothesis, we follow Eichengreen et al. (2012) to use annual windows to estimate the per-
centage of total variance in the weekly fluctuations set of 11 sectorial indices that is explained by the
first principal component, as well as by the first two-, three-, and four-principal components [Figure
4.2].
3It is interesting to note that the government sector seems to have a strong specific behavior that explains its association with
the second principal component in spite of having a loading in the first component in line with that of the other sectors.
4A decision in line with other authors, like Rodríguez-Moreno and Peña (2013).
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FIGURE 4.2. Cumulative information content in the first four principal components
of sectorial returns.
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Note: Weekly data: January 2007-December 2015. The figure shows the percent variance
of the set of sectorial credit returns that is explained by the first k principal components
of sectorial credit indices, k=1,2,3,4.
At the beginning of 2007, the first common factor explained almost 40% of the total variation in sec-
torial CDS indices, with the first four factors explaining 75% of total variance. The explanatory power
of the first principal component sharply jumped from 32% in July 13, 2007, to 62% in August 20, 2007 at
the outbreak of the subprime crisis after the failure of three hedge funds at BNP Paribas. The increase
in explanatory power did not stop there: the Bear Sterns rescue on March 2008 produced a sharp in-
crease in the perception of risk across the economy, as reflected in the increase in commonality among
all sectors of activity. Consequently, the explanatory power of the first common factor continued on a
gradual increasing trend to a local maximum of 77% in the week of May 9, 2008. The maintained high
commonality of risk after May 2008 could have been taken at that time, well in advance of the Lehman
crisis, as an indication of potential future problems. These results are comparable to those obtained
by Berndt and Obreja (2010) and Chen and Härdle (2015), among others.
A sharp decrease was again observed in March 2011. On March 11, the EU decided to allow the
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) to buy debt in primary markets up to a 440-billion-euros
ceiling. It also resolved to cut the rates and extend the maturities of the emergency loans to Greece.
On the 21st, the EU summit agreed on a permanent bailout mechanism for the region to lend up to
50 billion euros starting in May 2013. The commonality in sectorial CDS indices declined from their
peaks but remained at the post-Bear Stearns elevated levels, indicating that risk was widespread across
the sectors. The explanatory power of the first common factor fell drastically to 43% on August 5, 2011.
The bail out of Portugal on May 5 and the rating cut for Greece on June 13 did not have a visible effect
on the explanatory power of the common factors. On the other hand, the downgrade of US debt on
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August 5, the deterioration of the economic situation in the US, the alarm of a potentially catastrophic
credit crisis in Europe and the downgrade of sovereign debt in southern European countries explain
the increase in the commonality of risk observed in the second part of the year to levels of 75% by the
end of 2011. From that point on, the explanatory power gradually decreased, staying at levels of 60%
over 2013, to come down again to around 40% at the end of our sample.
4.3. Sectorial indices, the iTraxx credit index and the global risk factor. To evaluate the characterist-
ics of the type of risk involved in a sectorial credit position we start by showing, in the second column
in Table 3 estimates of beta coefficients with respect to the iTraxx index, a natural choice as a risk factor.
As we can see, estimated betas lie in the (0.27; 0.51) interval, with R-squared values (column 3) ranging
from just above 0.20 for health care and technology, the two sectors with lower correlations with the
rest, to the neighborhood of 0.50 for the consumer goods, telecommunication services and the finan-
cial sectors. Since our sample includes European and North American firms, it is not surprising that
the CDX IG Index also has a noticeable explanatory power (not shown in the table).
TABLE 3. Regressions explaining sectorial credit indices
Beta iTraxx R2 iTraxx Beta GRF R2 GRF All indicators MSCI MSCI+iTraxx MSCI+GRF
BM 0.35 0.34 0.35 0.71 0.52 0.30 0.38 0.72
CG 0.38 0.47 0.34 0.77 0.65 0.36 0.50 0.77
CS 0.35 0.39 0.32 0.68 0.53 0.34 0.43 0.69
EN 0.38 0.37 0.36 0.70 0.53 0.37 0.43 0.70
FIN 0.48 0.53 0.38 0.70 0.72 0.43 0.57 0.71
GOV 0.44 0.32 0.39 0.50 0.43 0.28 0.35 0.51
HC 0.27 0.22 0.24 0.37 0.28 0.17 0.24 0.39
IND 0.39 0.44 0.36 0.79 0.59 0.36 0.48 0.79
TEC 0.29 0.24 0.28 0.46 0.31 0.19 0.25 0.46
TEL 0.51 0.47 0.43 0.70 0.56 0.39 0.51 0.71
UTI 0.33 0.44 0.29 0.69 0.55 0.31 0.46 0.69
Median 0.38 0.39 0.35 0.70 0.53 0.34 0.43 0.70
Note: Columns 2 and 3 show the slope and R2 in regressions from weekly changes in sectorial indices on weekly changes in iTraxx. Columns 4
and 5 show similar information when the Global risk factor is the explanatory variable. Column 6 shows the R2 from a regression on a set of
financial indicators described in the paper. Columns 7 to 9 show R2 from regressions on the sectorial MSCI index, that index together with
iTraxx, and the MSCI sectorial index together with the global risk factor (GRF).
BM = Basic materials, CG = Consumer goods, CS = Consumer services, EN = Energy, FIN = Financials, GOV = Government,
HC = Health care, IND = Industrials, TEC = Technology, TEL = Telecommunication services, and UTI = Utilities.
An important question for risk management would relate to the performance of a hedging strategy
for a CDS position in a given sector, based on taking a contrary position in the iTraxx Index, using the
least-squares estimate of beta for that sector. Except for a constant, the residuals from these regres-
sions would be the returns on the hedged portfolio, and the R-squared statistics show the reduction
achieved by the hedge on the variance of the sector portfolio. With the exception of health care and
technology sectors, hedging efficiency would be significant, with a substantial reduction in sectorial
credit index variance, between 32% and 53%, which shows an interesting potential for hedging credit
portfolios when they are sufficiently diversified in a given sector.
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Columns 4 and 5 in Table 3 contain betas and R-squared statistics from regressions explaining sec-
torial credit indices with the global risk factor estimated in the previous sector as the single explanat-
ory variable. The fact that the global risk factor contains a good deal of information on fluctuations
in sectorial CDS returns is to be expected, but it is surprising that it contains so much more explan-
atory power than credit market indices like iTraxx. The median R-squared is 0.70 for the global risk
factor and 0.39 for the iTraxx index. Its high information content may arise because by averaging CDS
spreads over the sectors, the first principal component incorporates some aspects of the credit market
that might be sector specific and not incorporated in standard credit indices. Furthermore, the iTraxx
may contain some idiosyncratic component unrelated to any specific sector, as reflected in the fact
that it often presents deviations from the theoretical price that could be estimated from prices for its
constituents, which could weaken its correlation with the sectorial credit indices. The high explan-
atory power on CDS issues from all sectors and geographical areas also justifies the interpretation of
the first principal component as representing a global risk factor. Even if we estimate a regression to
explain sectorial credit indices using all the indicators described in section 3.5 R-squared statistics do
not reach the explanatory power attained by the global risk factor (column 6). Incidentally, augmented
Dickey-Fuller statistics for the residuals from regressions of sectorial indices either on iTraxx or on the
global risk factor overwhelmingly reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in all sectors. That means
that both sets of regressions can be interpreted as cointegrating regressions, with sectorial indices
sharing the same stochastic trends as iTraxx or the global risk factor, differences between them being
short-lived.6 It also means that the use of either iTraxx or the global risk factor to explain or possibly
predict sectorial indices should be done through an error correction model. However, the difference
in R-squared statistics means that the global risk factor tracks sectorial indices much better than the
iTraxx index.
It is also interesting to see that the MSCI stock indices contain significant information on sectorial
credit indices (column 7), with a median R-squared of 0.34, showing that credit spreads react to events
in the stock markets. When we add the iTraxx index to the set of sectorial MSCI indices (column 8), R-
squared values suggest that there is some information in MSCI indices that is not captured by iTraxx.
It is striking that our estimated global risk factor seems to incorporate the information contained in
MSCI indices on the credit market, the MSCI indices not adding any information content to the global
risk factor to explain the sectorial credit indices.
4.4. The differential information contained in the global risk factor. We have already seen that the
GRF contains a significant amount of information beyond that contained in a credit index like iTraxx.
Explaining sectorial credit indices with the GRF yield R-squared statistics up to twice as high as those
obtained when we explain the sectorial indices with iTraxx, even though the time profiles of both
5In consistency with the credit data, we use the financial and macroeconomic indicators in weekly differences. Augmented
Dickey-Fuller statistics, calculated with four lags to eliminate residual autocorrelation in the unit root regressions, give values
between -4.42 and -12.10 suggesting that weekly changes for all the indicators are stationary.
6One-lag augmented Dickey-Fuller statistics for the residuals fall between -11.3 and -16.9 for regressions on iTraxx, and between
-12.5 and -18.1 for regressions on our estimated global risk factor.
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indices is quite similar. Figure 4.3 shows that the weekly differences in both indices are less than
perfectly correlated. Full-sample correlation is, in fact, 0.68. What disparate information is contained
in the global risk factor? A first piece of evidence comes from the last regression in Table 3 that adds
the global risk factor to the MSCI indices to explain sectorial indices. We obtain the same fit as with the
global risk factor alone, showing that that the global risk factor embeds all the information provided
by MSCI indices on sectorial risk credit. That is one difference in the information content between
iTraxx and the global risk factor.
FIGURE 4.3. Weekly changes in Global risk factor and iTraxx.
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Note: The scatterplt shows the weekly changes in the estimated global risk factor against those in iTraxx
Further evidence emerges from considering the residuals from a regression of the GRF on iTraxx.
Such residuals give us the component of our estimated global risk factor that is uncorrelated with
iTraxx. Thus, if we now correlate those residuals with the macroeconomic and financial indicators,
we can have some idea of what type of information is captured by the GRF that is not in iTraxx. Con-
sidering the correlations higher than 0.20 in absolute value, this analysis shows a negative associ-
ation between that component of the global risk factor and three financial variables: the spread of
the 3-month Libor rate over the USD Overnight Indexed Swap (OIS) (libor_ovn,(-)) (correlation sign
shown in parenthesis), the 1-year euro swap rate (-), and the 1-year US swap rate (ussw1,(-)). Being a
global index, it also presents a positive correlation with two credit indices, the Japanese iTraxx index
(itraxxJ,(+)), and the high yield CDX index (cdxhy,(+)). Finally, it has negative correlation with all MSCI
indices, being above 0.20 with the materials, industrials, telecommunications and financial MSCI in-
dices. Correlation signs are the same as those obtained for the global risk factor and these same in-
dicators. This means that the global risk factor contains information on these indicators beyond the
correlation shown by the iTraxx index.
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5. SYSTEMIC AND IDIOSYNCRATIC COMPONENTS OF CREDIT RISK IN SECTORIAL PORTFOLIOS
We have proposed a simple method to estimate a global credit risk factor. The estimate uses CDS
data, so it captures only events that have a reflection on CDS spreads, and we have shown that it has
a high explanatory power on the time behavior of sectorial credit indices. Hence, the sectors with
more important systemic risk will be those whose index moves closer to the global credit risk factor.
Table 3 shows that the global risk factor has an R-squared above 70% over the whole period 2006-
2015 for a number of sectorial indices. The appearance of the financial sector in this group is in line
with the remarks made in Moody’s (Munves (2008)) and Basel BCBS (2011) papers. In the last one,
the Basel Committee proposed a specific increase in the estimated value of asset correlation for the
financial sector when calculating the level of regulatory capital required.7 The high R-squared for the
industrial sector possibly reflects the impact of the global financial crisis in the real economy, since the
industrial sector is distinctively dependent on financing and capital its their long-run investments, as
well as reflecting the impact of the increased deterioration in the global housing market. The inclusion
of consumer goods among the more systemic credit sectors can be due to the cyclical nature of the
solvency of consumer credit.
Along the same line of reasoning, health care and technology would be the two least systemic sec-
tors, in consistency with their lower correlations with other sectorial indices that we already saw in
Table 3.2. The systemic nature of the health care sector is not surprising, taking into account the
robust growth that it is experiencing around the world. This is especially the case in the developed
countries (which represent the major part of our data sample) as the population of these countries is
getting older, with more economic resources and a greater demand for health care services so as to
achieve a better quality of life. As a consequence, the health care sector has been less influenced by
the recent crisis. The specific nature of innovation in this industry, which has a life cycle very different
from the other sectors of the economy, may explain the characterization of the technology sector as
being less systemic than the rest.
Figure 5.1 shows the explanatory power (R-squared statistic) attained by the global risk factor in
rolling window regressions of the sectorial indices, which can be taken as a measure of the relevance
of the systemic component of credit risk across sectors. They all show a similar pattern, except for the
health care and technological sectors, which show a more disparate behavior. The relevance over time
of the idiosyncratic component would be estimated as 1.0 minus the R-squared in previous figures,
as shown in Figure 5.2. We can see that, as a general rule, the systemic components become more
relevant in stressed periods, when CDS spreads increase, while idiosyncratic components of risk be-
come more important in calm periods. This must be reflecting increased correlations across sectorial
indices in stressed periods and lower correlations in tranquil periods.
7That correlation was set at 30%, up from the previous value of 24%, while the 24% correlation was kept for the rest of corporate
sectors.
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We could think of the residuals in the regressions of sectorial credit indices on the global risk factor
as being the idiosyncratic component of credit risk in each sector. A perfectly adequate credit risk
factor would capture all the commonality across sectors and hence, the residuals should be sector-
specific, with low correlations between them, in the spirit of idiosyncratic components. Indeed, the
median absolute correlation between the residuals for any two sectors is just 0.094. Being small, it is
less than fully satisfactory, because it means that about half of the 55 correlations between sectorial
idiosyncratic components are statistically significant, but the highest correlation is 0.29, and the 90%
percentil is just 0.21. These correlations suggest that there might be some additional common element
among the sectorial credit indices that is not captured by the global risk factor, although its explanat-
ory power does not seem to be too large.
FIGURE 5.1. Relevance of systemic sectorial components.
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Note: Weekly data: January 2007-December 2015. BM = Basic materials, CG = Consumer goods, CS = Consumer services, EN =
Energy, FIN = Financials, GOV = Government, HC = Health care, IND = Industrials, TEC = Technology,
TEL = Telecommunication services, and UTI = Utilities.
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FIGURE 5.2. Relevance of idiosyncratic sectorial components.
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Note: Weekly data: January 2007-December 2015. BM = Basic materials, CG = Consumer goods, CS = Consumer services, EN = Energy, FIN
= Financials, GOV = Government, HC = Health care, IND = Industrials, TEC = Technology,
TEL = Telecommunication services, and UTI = Utilities.
6. DECOMPOSITION OF RISK AT THE LEVEL OF THE FIRM: SYSTEMIC, SECTORIAL AND IDIOSYNCRATIC
RISKS
In the previous section we have analyzed the nature of credit risk in sectorial portfolios. Such in-
formation is needed for a rigorous asset allocation of credit among sectors. We now come down to the
analysis of the characteristics of risk in some specific sectors, which should be the guide for asset alloc-
ation decisions inside a given sector. We want to measure to what extent firms in the sector are subject
to systemic risk as well as to sectorial risk and what the relevance of idiosyncratic risk is. We count as
systemic risk events that have influence across the global credit markets. By sectorial risk we under-
stand events that affect all firms in the sector, with no essential effect elsewhere. The idiosyncratic
component of risk is obtained as the residual of each firm’s CDS return after extracting the systemic
and sectorial components of risk. Such evaluation of the relevance of risk components has obvious
implications on the asset allocation strategy by a given financial institution that wants to diversify its
credit portfolio in that sector. In designing their credit policy, financial institutions should avoid firms
with a large systemic risk component in favor of those with larger idiosyncratic risk components, al-
ways trying to form sufficiently diversified portfolios. As a byproduct, we also want to analyze whether
the risk structure is common to a given sector in different geographical areas, such as the financial
sectors of Europe and North America. That might suggest that sectorial characteristics are possibly
more important than geographical characteristics in determining CDS spreads.
To estimate the systemic component of risk we will use the same approach as with the sectorial
indices: we estimate a regression of the CDS spread for each firm on the global risk factor that we
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have introduced in previous sections, taking the fitted value as the systemic component in the CDS
spread, and the R-squared as a measure of the relevance of the systemic component of risk for that
firm. After that, we run a second regression on the global risk factor plus the first intra-sector principal
component of CDS spreads. For each sector, this last variable will contain some features common
across firms in the sector, possibly together with some elements of systemic risk. Subtracting from the
joint explanatory power, measured by the adjusted R-squared, that of the systemic component alone,
we will have an estimate of the relevance of sector-specific risk. What is left to 100% is an estimate of
the size of the idiosyncratic component of risk for each firm. The residual in the last regression can be
taken as an estimate of the unobserved idiosyncratic risk component.
6.1. European financial and industrial sectors. BCBS (2012) identifies five broad categories of factors
that influence global systemic importance. The selected indicators reflect the size of banks, their in-
terconnectedness, the lack of readily available substitutes or financial institution infrastructure for the
services they provide, their global (cross-jurisdictional) activity and their complexity. Table 4 shows an
example of the interconnectedness in the European financial sector with a decomposition of CDS risk
for its firms. Systemic credit risk factors account for between 8% and 58% of total risk in the firms
in this sector, and the intra-sector first principal component explains between 6% and 86% of CDS
risk. Sectorial risk falls between 0% and 44% and idiosyncratic risk is between 13% and 92%. In terms
of median values, systemic risk accounts for 42% of total risk, sectorial risk is 21% and idiosyncratic
risk 30% of total risk. In half of the firms, 26 out of 52, the systemic component of risk is the most
important, whereas in 22 firms, the idiosyncratic component of risk is highest.
These figures are similar to those shown in the European industrial sector, although in the financial
sector the idiosyncratic component is much more important. In 22 of the 26 European industrial
firms in our sample, the systemic component of risk was the most important, with the idiosyncratic
component being highest in just 4 firms.
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TABLE 4. Credit risk decomposition for the European financial sector
firm (1)
Systemic Sectorial
Both (4)
Sectorial Idiosyncratic
Risk (2) PC (3) Risk (5) Risk (6)
AXA 58% 75% 76% 19% 24%
Legal & Gen Gp PLC 57% 69% 71% 15% 29%
Mediobanca SpA 56% 80% 80% 25% 20%
Prudential PLC 55% 66% 69% 14% 31%
Assicurazioni Generali S p A 52% 81% 81% 29% 19%
Aviva plc 52% 75% 75% 23% 25%
Rabobank Nederland 50% 80% 80% 30% 20%
ING Bk N V 50% 86% 86% 36% 14%
Old Mut plc 50% 45% 54% 3% 47%
HSBC Bk plc 50% 81% 81% 31% 19%
Royal & Sun Alliance Ins PLC 49% 70% 70% 21% 30%
Bca Pop di Milano Soc Coop a r l 49% 76% 76% 27% 24%
Munich Re 49% 78% 78% 29% 22%
Bca Monte dei Paschi di Siena S p A 48% 76% 76% 29% 24%
Bca Naz del Lavoro S p A 47% 80% 80% 33% 20%
Std Chartered Bk 46% 73% 73% 27% 27%
Societe Generale 45% 83% 84% 39% 16%
STANDARD CHARTERED PLC 45% 71% 71% 26% 29%
BNP Paribas 45% 86% 87% 41% 13%
ACE Ltd 44% 35% 45% 1% 55%
Aegon N.V. 44% 60% 60% 17% 40%
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB 43% 60% 60% 17% 40%
UBS AG 43% 78% 78% 35% 22%
Cr Agricole SA 43% 84% 86% 43% 14%
Hammerson PLC 42% 29% 42% 0% 58%
Deutsche Bk AG 42% 79% 80% 38% 20%
Bco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria S A 42% 76% 77% 35% 23%
Cr LYONNAIS 42% 82% 84% 42% 16%
Raiffeisen Zentralbank Oesterreich AG 42% 46% 49% 7% 51%
Inv AB 41% 23% 41% 0% 59%
Commerzbank AG 40% 80% 81% 41% 19%
Danske Bk A S 39% 59% 59% 20% 41%
Nordea Bk AB 38% 57% 57% 18% 43%
KBC Bk 38% 57% 57% 19% 43%
Barclays Bk plc 38% 80% 82% 44% 18%
Bco Comercial Portugues SA 36% 69% 70% 35% 30%
Royal Bk of Scotland Pub Ltd Co 36% 75% 77% 41% 23%
Klepierre 35% 21% 35% 0% 65%
Gecina 35% 37% 40% 5% 60%
3i Gp plc 34% 21% 34% 0% 66%
ISS Glob A S 32% 28% 33% 1% 67%
Bco de Sabadell S A 31% 51% 51% 20% 49%
Svenska Handelsbanken AB 31% 50% 50% 19% 50%
Dexia Cr Loc 28% 58% 60% 32% 40%
Bay Landbk Giroz 26% 50% 51% 24% 50%
Landbk Baden Wuertbg 25% 39% 38% 14% 62%
Nationwide Bldg Soc 24% 45% 45% 21% 55%
Brit Ld Co plc 21% 11% 21% 0% 79%
DZ Bk AG 21% 23% 25% 4% 75%
IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG 14% 22% 22% 8% 78%
Ld Secs PLC 12% 8% 12% 0% 88%
Storebrand ASA 8% 6% 8% 0% 92%
Note: Colum1 shows the company name from Markit database. Column 2 displays the adjusted R-squared from a regression on the Global risk
factor, which we take as a measure of the relevance of the systemic component. Column 3 shows the R-squared from a regression on the sectorial
index. Column 4 shows the R-squared from a regression on both indices. The relevance of the sectorial component of risk is obatined as the
difference between columns 4 and 2. The relevance of the idiosyncratic component of risk is obtained as 1 minus the R-squared in column 4.
Bold figures indicate the most important factor the risk decomposition for each firm.
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TABLE 5. Credit risk decomposition for the European industrial sector
firm (1)
Systemic Sectorial
Both (4)
Sectorial Idiosyncratic
Risk (2) PC (3) Risk (5) Risk (6)
Cie de St Gobain 65% 79% 79% 13% 21%
THALES 62% 77% 77% 15% 23%
Lafarge 62% 74% 74% 13% 26%
Vinci 59% 74% 74% 15% 26%
Adecco S A 59% 69% 69% 10% 31%
AB Volvo 59% 74% 74% 15% 26%
BAE Sys PLC 56% 70% 70% 14% 30%
ASSA ABLOY AB 56% 59% 60% 4% 40%
Atlas Copco AB 56% 56% 59% 3% 41%
Rexam plc 55% 63% 63% 8% 37%
Volvo Treas AB 55% 66% 66% 12% 34%
SCANIA AB 55% 63% 63% 9% 37%
Metso Corp 54% 59% 60% 6% 40%
Siemens AG 53% 58% 59% 6% 41%
Finmeccanica S p A 52% 66% 66% 14% 34%
ROLLSROYCE PLC 51% 68% 68% 17% 32%
Deutsche Lufthansa AG 49% 63% 64% 15% 36%
SOCIETE AIR FRANCE 49% 60% 60% 12% 40%
HeidelbergCement AG 48% 60% 60% 12% 40%
Securitas AB 47% 56% 56% 9% 44%
Deutsche Post AG 46% 57% 57% 11% 43%
ALSTOM 44% 56% 56% 12% 44%
Brit Awys plc 44% 52% 52% 8% 48%
AB SKF 43% 43% 45% 2% 55%
Smiths Gp Plc 39% 48% 48% 9% 52%
Rentokil Initial 1927 Plc 25% 31% 31% 6% 69%
ote: Colum1 shows the company name from Markit database. Column 2 displays the adjusted R-squared from a regression on the Global risk
factor, which we take as a measure of the relevance of the systemic component. Column 3 shows the R-squared from a regression on the sectorial
index. Column 4 shows the R-squared from a regression on both indices. The relevance of the sectorial componnet of risk is obatined as the
difference between columns 4 and 2. The relevance of the idiosyncratic component of risk is obtained as 1 minus the R-squared in column 4.
Bold figures indicate the most important factor the risk decomposition for each firm.
6.2. North American financial and industrial sectors. In terms of median R-squared values across
North American financial firms, the systemic factor accounts for 38% of total CDS return risk, sectorial
factors explain 12%, and firm-specific factors explain the largest amount, 48% of total CDS risk [Table
6]. Thus, 50% of the credit risk in these firms has a systemic or sectorial nature, the other 50% being
idiosyncratic, which leaves significant possibilities for portfolio diversification. These figures are very
similar to those we obtained for the North American industrial sector.
For the North American industrial firms, the systemic component explains 38% of credit risk, with
the sectorial component accounting for 12% of risk and the idiosyncratic component explaining 46%,
in median terms. In 21 out of the 37 firms, firm-specific factors are the most important component of
risk, with systemic risk being the most important one in the remaining 16 firms.
This result once more suggests the difficulty in finding a successful hedge for undiversified positions
in CDS from these firms, which might possibly be explained by the lack of liquidity of the CDS market.
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TABLE 6. Credit risk decomposition for the North American financial sector
firm (1)
Systemic Sectorial
Both (4)
Sectorial Idiosyncratic
Risk (2) PC (3) Risk (5) Risk (6)
Simon Ppty Gp L P 59% 64% 67% 8% 33%
Simon Ppty Gp Inc 57% 60% 63% 6% 37%
Amern Express Co 54% 77% 77% 23% 23%
HARTFORD FINL SERVICES GROUP INC 54% 75% 75% 22% 25%
Prudential Finl Inc 53% 74% 73% 20% 27%
MetLife Inc 53% 77% 77% 24% 23%
Caterpillar Finl Svcs Corp 53% 53% 58% 4% 42%
ERP Oper Ltd Pship 53% 58% 60% 7% 40%
Avalon Bay Cmntys Inc 53% 54% 57% 5% 43%
Berkshire Hathaway Inc 52% 63% 64% 12% 36%
Gen Elec Cap Corp 52% 69% 69% 18% 31%
Lincoln Natl Corp 50% 67% 67% 16% 33%
John Deere Cap Corp 49% 51% 54% 5% 46%
CNA Finl Corp 48% 61% 61% 13% 39%
Allstate Corp 48% 64% 64% 17% 36%
HSBC Fin Corp 47% 65% 64% 17% 36%
INTL LEASE FIN CORP 45% 63% 63% 18% 37%
DUKE Rlty Ltd PARTNERSHIP 45% 36% 45% 0% 55%
Mack Cali Rlty LP 44% 39% 45% 1% 55%
CHUBB CORP 44% 60% 60% 17% 40%
Boeing Cap Corp 44% 47% 49% 6% 51%
JPMorgan Chase & Co 42% 64% 64% 22% 36%
Cap One Finl Corp 41% 64% 65% 24% 35%
Goldman Sachs Gp Inc 40% 63% 64% 24% 36%
Liberty Mut Ins Co 39% 55% 55% 15% 45%
Loews Corp 39% 47% 47% 9% 53%
G A T X Corp 38% 35% 40% 2% 60%
Bk of America Corp 38% 63% 64% 26% 37%
Aon Corp 37% 48% 48% 11% 52%
Natl Rural Utils Coop Fin Corp 37% 50% 50% 14% 50%
Citigroup Inc 36% 63% 65% 29% 35%
Wells Fargo & Co 35% 64% 66% 31% 34%
Morgan Stanley 35% 62% 64% 29% 36%
SEARS ROEBUCK Accep CORP 32% 31% 34% 2% 66%
Amern Express Cr Corp 31% 42% 42% 11% 58%
Amern Intl Gp Inc 31% 49% 49% 19% 51%
Marsh & Mclennan Cos Inc 27% 36% 36% 9% 64%
Toyota Mtr Cr Corp 27% 18% 26% 0% 74%
EOP Oper Ltd Pship 27% 27% 29% 2% 71%
MGIC Invt Corp 26% 43% 44% 18% 56%
Radian Asset Assurn Inc 25% 42% 43% 18% 57%
Radian Gp Inc 25% 43% 44% 19% 56%
HEALTHCARE Rlty Tr Inc 24% 21% 24% 0% 76%
Safeco Corp 24% 26% 27% 3% 73%
BROOKFIELD ASSET Mgmt INC 18% 8% 21% 2% 79%
Fairfax Finl Hldgs Ltd 18% 19% 19% 2% 81%
Amern Finl Gp Inc 17% 12% 16% 0% 84%
Odyssey Re Hldgs Corp 15% 20% 20% 4% 80%
MBIA Ins Corp 15% 31% 33% 18% 67%
MBIA Inc. 13% 32% 36% 23% 64%
Highwoods Rlty LP 7% 6% 7% 0% 93%
Legg Mason Inc 2% 1% 3% 1% 97%
ote: Colum1 shows the company name from Markit database. Column 2 displays the adjusted R-squared from a regression on the Global risk
factor, which we take as a measure of the relevance of the systemic component. Column 3 shows the R-squared from a regression on the sectorial
index. Column 4 shows the R-squared from a regression on both indices. The relevance of the sectorial componnet of risk is obatined as the
difference between columns 4 and 2. The relevance of the idiosyncratic component of risk is obtained as 1 minus the R-squared in column 4.
Bold figures indicate the most important factor the risk decomposition for each firm.
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TABLE 7. Credit risk decomposition for the North American industrial sector
firm (1)
Systemic Sectorial
Both (4)
Sectorial Idiosyncratic
Risk (2) PC (3) Risk (5) Risk (6)
Utd Tech Corp 53% 70% 70% 17% 30%
Caterpillar Inc 50% 71% 71% 21% 29%
Deere & Co 48% 70% 70% 22% 30%
Eaton Corp 48% 52% 54% 6% 46%
Textron Finl Corp 47% 53% 54% 7% 46%
Gen Dynamics Corp 47% 71% 71% 25% 29%
Cummins Inc 46% 54% 55% 9% 45%
TEXTRON INC 46% 58% 58% 12% 42%
Boeing Co 45% 66% 66% 21% 34%
Arrow Electrs Inc 45% 58% 58% 14% 42%
Emerson Elec Co 44% 57% 57% 14% 43%
Packaging Corp Amer 44% 51% 52% 8% 48%
Ryder Sys Inc 43% 57% 57% 14% 43%
Danaher Corp 42% 54% 54% 12% 46%
Raytheon Co 40% 68% 70% 29% 30%
Southwest Airls Co 40% 58% 58% 18% 42%
Lockheed Martin Corp 39% 65% 66% 27% 34%
Owens IL Inc 38% 43% 44% 6% 56%
Norfolk Sthn Corp 38% 66% 68% 30% 32%
Navistar Intl Corp 37% 34% 39% 1% 61%
Utd Rents Inc 37% 41% 42% 5% 58%
CSX Corp 37% 63% 64% 28% 36%
Sealed Air Corp US 36% 49% 49% 13% 51%
FedEx Corp 36% 58% 59% 23% 41%
Cdn Natl Rwy Co 35% 47% 47% 12% 53%
L 3 Comms Corp 33% 43% 43% 10% 57%
R R Donnelley & Sons Co 28% 40% 40% 12% 60%
1st Data Corp 26% 40% 41% 15% 59%
Waste Mgmt Inc 24% 27% 28% 4% 72%
Rd King Infstruc 20% 12% 21% 1% 79%
Owens Brockway Glass Container Inc 19% 21% 22% 2% 78%
Rep Svcs Inc 19% 22% 23% 3% 77%
JetBlue Awys Corp 11% 14% 14% 2% 86%
Cooper Inds Ltd 7% 7% 7% 1% 93%
Sonoco Prods Co 6% 4% 6% 0% 94%
PHH Corp 3% 2% 2% 0% 98%
Briggs & Stratton Corp 2% 1% 2% 0% 98%
Note: Colum1 shows the company name from Markit database. Column 2 displays the adjusted R-squared from a regression on the Global risk
factor, which we take as a measure of the relevance of the systemic component. Column 3 shows the R-squared from a regression on the sectorial
index. Column 4 shows the R-squared from a regression on both indices. The relevance of the sectorial componnet of risk is obatined as the
difference between columns 4 and 2. The relevance of the idiosyncratic component of risk is obtained as 1 minus the R-squared in column 4.
Bold figures indicate the most important factor the risk decomposition for each firm.
6.3. An effective separation of the sectorial and idiosyncratic components of risk. The estimated
idiosyncratic component of CDS risk turns out to be quite large in many firms, especially in the US
market, so we should worry about the possibility that this might be due to measurement error in the
idiosyncratic component, which could still contain some elements of systemic risk. To check on the
effectiveness of our methodology to identify the idiosyncratic component of credit risk we discuss now
two related issues.
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The first issue is whether our estimated sectorial component of risk is free from idiosyncratic fea-
tures. CDS spreads for North American financial firms have a median pairwise linear correlation coef-
ficient of 0.49, while the median correlation between each firm in that sector and the financial sector
credit index we constructed in section 4.1 is 0.66, with a highest correlation of 0.78. Thus, North Amer-
ican financial firms share important elements of risk and they bear a relatively close association with
the sectorial credit index, showing that there exists a well-defined sectorial component of risk.
The intrasector first principal component for these firms has a still higher correlation, of 0.88, with
the credit index for the financial sector. Such correlation is unexpectedly high. The financial sector
index of section 4.1 is made up by the median spread negotiated each day in CDS by all firms in the
financial sector from all the different geographical regions. Therefore, each daily observation on the
financial sector index may come from a different financial firm, and even from a different country. On
the other hand, the principal component for the North American financial sector is a linear combin-
ation of spreads from all CDSs traded each day by North American firms. Hence, it is some sort of
average of these specific CDSs, all of them from the same geographical area. The two measures are
different enough so that such a high correlation between them is remarkable. It shows that the aver-
age of CDS spreads that is embedded into the intra-sector principal component is quite successful at
filtering out idiosyncratic components, essentially capturing the same sectorial features as the credit
index for the global financial sector.
Strikingly enough, the European financial sector shares these characteristics: the correlation between
our estimate of the sectorial component of risk and the financial sector credit index from section 4.1 is
0.79.8 Individual CDS spreads have moderately high correlations between them, with a median value
of 0.67, and a median correlation of 0.72 with the financial sector credit index, with a maximum of
0.82. Again, the estimated sectorial component of risk is much closer to the sectorial credit index than
CDS spreads for individual firms, showing that the former is quite free from idiosyncratic features.
The bottom line of this analysis is that we can indeed use the principal component methodology
with data from a given geographical region to extract a sectorial component of risk that turns out to
be similar to the sectorial credit index that can be obtained from all CDS trading in all regions. Our
construction of the global sector factor is not directly responsible for this result. In fact, choosing the
median of all CDS spreads traded each day over the world does not seem to be the most direct way to
generate a high correlation with an average of sector spreads in a specific region. The implications are
important. They suggest that the first intrasector principal component across firms is essentially free
of firm idiosyncratic characteristics, thereby justifying our estimates of sectorial components of risk.
The second issue relates to whether our estimates of the idiosyncratic components of risk have the
appropriate features. First of all, our estimates of the idiosyncratic components of risk turn out to
be essentially uncorrelated across firms, which is a necessary condition for the interpretation we give
8Incidentally, remember that the financial sector credit index is the same for European and North American firms.
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TABLE 8. Variance reduction for sectorial portfolios
Sector Number of firms
More Less Equally
idiosyncratic idiosyncratic weighted
portfolio
European industrial
5 firms 45% 63%
64%10 firms 57% 64%
20 firms 65% 65%
North American industrial
5 firms 8% 46%
52%10 firms 23% 47%
20 firms 51% 44%
European financial
5 firms 23% 55%
60%10 firms 40% 58%
20 firms 50% 59%
North American financial
5 firms 13% 48%
54%10 firms 25% 52%
20 firms 40% 54%
Note: The table shows the reduction in variance from alternative portfolios, when the hedge is constructed by taking a contrary position in the
iTraxx index. Results are provided for portfolios of the 5, 10 and 30 firms with the highest or the lowest idiosyncratic components of risk in the
four sectors considered, as well as for the equally weighted portfolio made up with all the firms in the sector.
to this component. There are 26 firms in the European industrial sector, 42 in the North American
industrial sector, 52 in the European financial sector, and 52 firms in the North American financial
sector. That amounts to 325 and 861 correlations between pairs of idiosyncratic components in the
European and North American industrial sectors and 1326 correlations in the European and North
American financial sectors. Median correlations are very low: -0.06, -0.02, -0.03 and -0.03, respectively.
Ninety per cent of them are below 0.26, 0.27, 0.24 and 0.18, respectively, in absolute value. These are
all low levels that justify an interpretation of our estimated idiosyncratic components as being firm-
specific in nature.
A further check on the nature of our estimated idiosyncratic components consists of examining
the possibility of diversification. Portfolios made up of firms with a high idiosyncratic component
should be hard to hedge unless we include a large number of such firms. For a given size, portfolios
made up of firms with a low idiosyncratic component of risk should be much easier to hedge than
portfolios of the same size made up of firms with low idiosyncratic components. Table 8 shows the
reduction in variance of portfolios of different sizes when we hedge them taking a contrary position
in Traxx. Portfolios in the table include groups of 5, 10 or 20 firms having either the highest or the
lowest estimated idiosyncratic components. The results are as expected: the efficiency of the hedge,
as measured by the reduction in variance, is higher for the portfolios made up of less idiosyncratic
firms than for those built with the more idiosyncratic firms. Also, the efficiency increases with the size
of the portfolio, converging, as the number of firms grows, to the efficiency achieved when hedging
the equally weighted portfolio for each sector.
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The low correlation among the idiosyncratic components of individual firms and the good possib-
ilities for hedging risk of a well-diversified sectorial portfolio suggest that our estimates of the idiosyn-
cratic components of risk are appropriate.
But then, what is behind the large idiosyncratic component of risk? A possible conjecture for the
large size of idiosyncratic components of risk might be, again, that they are just a reflection of the low
liquidity in some issues. To check on this assumption, we could try to relate the size of the estimated
idiosyncratic risk with either the number of contributors giving price to the 5-year CDS (Composite
depth 5yr.), the quality rating of the data provided by Markit, or the volatility of CDS returns. In the
latter case, the argument would be that illiquid CDSs would often repeat price in the Markit quotes,
with the time series of CDS spreads then having a relatively low variance. Hence, we would expect
a negative correlation between the size of the idiosyncratic component of risk and the volatility of
CDS spreads. The correlation between the size of the idiosyncratic risk component and the annual
volatility of CDS returns among European financial firms is equal to -0.60, being equal to -0.46 for
North American financial firms. Thus, there seems to be, in fact, some evidence on the fact that the
large size of the idiosyncratic risk component for some firms is in part due to the low liquidity of their
CDSs.
6.4. Synthetic factor regressions. To further clarify the relative importance of the different possible
sources of risk in determining the different risk components for individual firms, we will use a syn-
thetic factor for each group of indicators in section 3: MSCI indices as indicators from equity markets,
and macroeconomic, risk aversion, interest rate and financial indicators, all of them in weekly differ-
ences to avoid non-stationarity.9
Some indicators display significant correlations. Weekly changes in 5- and 10-year swap rates have
linear correlation coefficients of 0.94, 0.91 and 0.89 for the US, Europe and Japan, respectively. Cor-
relations between 1- and 5-year swap rates are also high, although somewhat lower: 0.66, 0.72 and
0.69 for the US, Europe and Japan. Across countries, 10-year swap rates in dollars and euros have a
correlation of 0.70, while the 10-year swap rate in yens has lower correlations, slightly above 0.50, with
those in US dollars and euros. The correlation pattern between 5-year swap rates is very similar, while
1-year rates have lower correlations. The yield on the 10-year German bond and the 10-year T-bill rate
have a high correlation, of 0.91 and 0.95, with the euro and US dollar 10-year swap rates, respectively.
Similar results arises for the correlations between the yields on the 5-year German bond and the 5-
year Tbill, on the one hand, and the euro and US dollar 5-year swap rates, on the other. European
and US 3-month rates have a correlation of 0.52. Term structure slopes in euros and US dollars have
a correlation of 0.60, both having a lower correlation with the Japanese slope. Stock market volatilites
for Europe and the US, VSTOXX and VIX, have a high correlation of 0.87, while the credit volatilities,
9The composition of these groups of indicators is specified in Section 3 except that, to avoid excessive collinearity among the
synthetic factors, we exclude the 5- and 10-year government rates from the set of macroeconomic factors, which ends up con-
taining the euro-dollar and yen-dollar exchange rates together with the slope and curvature of the term structure in euros, US
dollars, and yens.
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ViTraxx and VCDX, have a lower correlation, of 0.67. Correlations between weekly changes in the ten
sectorial MSIC indices fall between 0.54 and 0.93, with a median correlation of 0.75.
To avoid collinearity and to exploit optimally this common information, we obtain synthetic indic-
ators by taking principal components in each group of indicators with the hope of explaining around
80% of the fluctuation in the whole group. A single principal component is enough among the set of
MSCI indices, while two principal components are needed among the risk aversion, macro, interest
rate, and financial indicators. However, the second principal components of each group do not add
any explanatory power for GRF. The only exception is the second principal component for the finan-
cial indicators, which contributes with additional information to explain GRF. That synthetic indicator
is an average of the 1-, 5- and 10-year US swap rates, so that it can be interpreted as the general level
of medium- and long-term interest rates in the US. In fact, the first principal component of this sub-
set of indicators, which is a broad average of interest rates across the three areas we have considered:
eurozone, US and Japan, does not add information content to the other factors to explain the GRF. The
synthetic equity indicator has a correlation above 0.75 with all sectorial MSCI indices except health-
care, so that it captures the general evolution of stock prices.
Interestingly enough, the risk indicator shows the highest correlation with swaption implied volatil-
ities, both in euros and US dollars, even more than with stock market, credit or exchange rate volatility.
Thus, swaption-implied volatility seems to be dominant among the set of risk indicators. The macro
synthetic indicator essentially captures a positive dependence from the slopes of the US and euro term
structures and a negative dependence from their term structure curvature. The interest rate indicator
is an approximate average of the 3-month euro rate and the Eonia rate. Finally, the synthetic financial
indicator essentially captures risk in medium- and long-term US interest rates.
For each firm in a given sector, we estimate a regression explaining weekly variations in CDS spreads
using the synthetic factors described above. To make coefficient estimates comparable, we have stand-
ardized the synthetic indicators by subtracting their sample mean and dividing by their standard de-
viation. The regressions provide us with beta estimates for each firm on the five synthetic factors:
equity, macroeconomic, risk aversion, interest rates and financial. In the four sectors considered,
the coefficients on the equity, risk aversion and interest rates factors are negative, while those in the
macroeconomic and financial factors are positive. Then, we calculate for each factor the correlation,
across the firms in a given sector, between the absolute values of the estimated betas for that factor
and our estimates of the relevance of each type of risk, with the results shown in Table 9.10
10With samples between 26 and 52 firms in each sector, statistical significance would require correlation coefficients above 0.30
in absolute value.
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TABLE 9. Correlations between the size of the risk components and the sensitivity to
the synthetic risk factors
MSCI Risk Macro
Interest
Financial
rates
European Industrial
Systemic 0.40 0.58 0.42 -0.24 -0.04
sectorial 0.43 0.65 0.75 -0.09 0.19
Idiosyncratic -0.48 -0.70 -0.62 0.22 -0.04
US Industrial
Systemic 0.67 0.68 0.71 0.25 0.21
sectorial 0.55 0.56 0.73 0.20 0.35
Idiosyncratic -0.69 -0.70 -0.79 -0.25 -0.29
European Financial
Systemic 0.73 0.63 0.46 0.32 -0.03
sectorial 0.58 0.71 0.89 -0.48 -0.39
Idiosyncratic -0.77 -0.80 -0.84 0.15 0.28
US Financial
Systemic 0.66 0.51 0.33 0.21 0.15
sectorial 0.71 0.68 0.61 -0.50 -0.03
Idiosyncratic -0.84 -0.72 -0.55 0.09 -0.10
Note: The table shows the linear correlation, across the firms in a given sector, between the absolute values of the coefficients estimated in the
regression of weekly changes in CDS spreads on the synthetic factors and the estimated size of each risk component.
Systemic firms should be expected to react to events affecting the global situation of the economy.
Indeed, we obtain that CDS spreads from firms with higher systemic risk have a higher sensitivity to
stock market prices, to the perception of future risk as captured by implied volatilities, and to the slope
of the term structure, which is known to be a good indicator of future business cycle events. These
are correlations with the estimated factor sensitivity, they are not correlations with the synthetic risk
factors. Hence, the negative correlation across firms between the relevance of idiosyncratic risk and
the equity, macroeconomic, and risk aversion factors means that the more idiosyncratic the firm, the
less responsive it is to changes in these synthetic factors, as expected. Firms with a high sectorial
component of risk have a pattern of sensitivities to the synthetic factors similar to those of the more
systemic firms although, as shown in Tables 4 to 7, the sectorial component of risk is usually not too
important.
7. CONCLUSIONS
Whether or not the failure of a single firm evolves into a systemic crisis depends on the relevance
of each firm in a given sector, as well as on the relevance of each sector in the global economy. In
this paper we have advanced a decomposition of credit risk at the level of individual firms among
systemic, sectorial and idiosyncratic components. At the level of sectors we have decomposed risk
into a systemic and an idiosyncratic component. Decomposition of risk into systematic sectorial and
idiosyncratic factors is very useful because of the large-portfolio properties of idiosyncratic risk. As
a portfolio becomes more granular, idiosyncratic risk is diversified away at the portfolio level. In the
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limit, when a portfolio becomes “infinitely fine-grained,” idiosyncratic risk vanishes at the portfolio
level, and only systematic and sectorial risk remains.
We have started by estimating a global risk factor. The information provided by this analysis has
helped us to implement the risk decompositions mentioned above. We have identified the consumer
goods and industrial sectors as being the most systemic. Health care and technology are the sectors
displaying a higher idiosyncratic component of risk and therefore, a lower correlation with all the other
sectors. We have shown that well diversified credit portfolios with CDSs from a given sector have good
possibilities for hedging by taking a contrary position in iTraxx or CDX indices or in their derivative
products. The systemic and sectorial components explain around 65% of credit risk in the European
industrial and financial firms, and 50% in the North American firms of those sectors, with 35% and
50% of credit risk, respectively, being idiosyncratic, which leaves a significant margin for portfolio
diversification. The fact that idiosyncratic components of risk are larger in North American than in
European firms may be due to a lack of liquidity.
Our analysis provides an element for a risk appetite framework at financial institutions, since they
could easily use the numerical estimates of risk components we propose to maintain their risk limits
when taking their asset allocation decisions. Indeed, we have shown evidence suggesting that port-
folios made up of firms with higher idiosyncratic components are easier to hedge, contrary to what
happens with portfolios made up of firms with lower idiosyncratic risk components. This is observed
uniformly over the industrial and financial sectors of Europe and North America. Furthermore, by
evaluating the firms and sectors with the most potential to produce systemic risk problems, our ana-
lysis should also be considered to be crucial for supervisors and regulators. Finally, we explore the
nature of each estimated risk component by analyzing its sensitivity to some synthetic risk factors. We
have shown systemic firms to react to events affecting the global situation of the economy, having a
higher sensititivy to risk factors based on stock market prices, the perception of future risk as captured
by implied volatilities, or some business cycle indicators. We have also shown that the more idiosyn-
cratic the firm, the less responsive it is to changes in these global factors. Both results support our
decomposition of credit risk.
Additionally, our analysis has clear implications for credit risk management, since the sectorial
strategy should depend on the risk decomposition of firms in a given sector. Indeed, it would seem ap-
propriate to impose a maximum exposure to sectors where firms have a large systematic risk compon-
ent while being relatively flexible about the distribution inside the sector, since a small idiosyncratic
component would not allow us to extract the benefits of diversification by increasing the number of
firms in the portfolio. On the contrary, in a sector where firms have large idiosyncratic risk compon-
ent, we should avoid having a high name concentration, since a better diversification would reduce
the total risk of the portfolio.
30 SPLITTING CREDIT RISK INTO SYSTEMIC, SECTORIAL AND IDIOSYNCRATIC COMPONENTS
We have restricted our analysis to firms on which CDS contracts have been issued. Further research
should attempt to relate our estimated risk components to firms’ characteristics such as size of assets
and liabilities, profit and loss results, equity and bond prices and market share. That would allow for
extending the evaluation of credit risk components for any other firm, even with no CDS contracs
inssued on its name.
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